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1. Introduction 
Special procedures are human rights monitoring mechanisms established by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or a 
phenomenon of human rights concern worldwide. The existence of special procedures is the 
unintended result of the competence accorded to the Commission on Human Rights and the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in the 1967 
Economic and Social Council Resolution No 1235 (XLII),1 by which these Commissions were 
authorised ‘to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’.2 This authorisation was understood as conferring power to nominate 
experts who could monitor the situation of human rights in specific countries (geographic 
mandates). Since 1980 this practice has been extended to, and largely replaced by, 
monitoring specific violations of human rights on a worldwide basis (thematic mandates). 
The lack of foresight in the creation of mechanisms which would come to be known as 
‘special procedures’ is a fundamental factor in explaining the diversity of legal frameworks 
that they use to promote and protect human rights. The conditions which regulate their 
creation and renewal also contribute to their variety. 
The birth of a special procedure is dependent on approval of a resolution creating the 
mandate by a simple majority of the UN Human Rights Council (or by its precursor, the 
Commission on Human Rights).3 As a consequence, the resolutions determining a special 
procedure mandate, including scope of competence and method of work, result from political 
negotiations between states. As these matters are often framed in vague and open-ended 
terms, special procedure mandate holders have been afforded great flexibility and autonomy 
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consultant to the Special Rapporteur on Torture. Special thanks to Joshua Castellino, Alice Donald, 
Cathal Doyle, José A. Guevara, David Keane, Philip Leach and Magdalena Sepúlveda for their 
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1 Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including politics of racial 
discrimination and of segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to 
colonial and other dependent countries and territories, 6 June 1967. 
2 Ibid. at para 2. 
3 Until 2006, the Commission on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social 
Council created in 1946, was the main human rights policy-making organ of the United Nations. It 
consisted of representatives of 53 states and met publicly once a year in Geneva for a six-week 
session: see ECOSOC Res 5 (I), 16 February 1946; and ECOSOC Res 9 (II), 21 June 1946. The 
Human Rights Council was created by GA Res 60/251, 15 March 2006. The Human Rights Council is 
a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly consisting of representatives of 47 states, which 
meets no fewer than three times every year for a period of no less than ten weeks.  
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when operationalising their activities. Such flexibility has led to a diversity of methodologies, 
and to the progressive expansion of the competences of special procedures through 
practice, adding to the complexity of the functions they have come to fulfil. Today, most 
special procedures cover not only the examination of situations of gross violations of human 
rights, but also extend to the consideration of complaints from individuals; the use of ‘urgent 
appeals’ to protect the life and/or physical integrity of people allegedly under imminent risk; 
the conduct of fact-finding missions; the provision of technical assistance; and the 
codification of emerging norms of international human rights norms[1].4 This latter activity will 
form the prime focus of this chapter. 
This chapter explores the contribution of mandate holders of special procedures to 
the coherence of international human rights standards using as a paradigm their diverse 
interpretation of the legal framework, which serves as the basis of their operations. It 
evaluates the extent to which the human rights norms developed by the special procedures 
are consonant with other international efforts to regulate the same matters.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. Sections 1 to 3 provide an overview of the 
role of special procedures in the creation and/or consolidation of new norms of international 
human rights in the context of clarifying their own scope of competences. Special attention is 
paid, in the final section, to the most salient human rights instruments drafted by mandate 
holders, understanding as such, those that have received approval or endorsement by their 
parent body, the Commission on Human Rights and, sometimes, also the General 
Assembly. Whether these efforts contribute to the strengthening of emerging trends in 
international law (for example, the recognition of the right to water, or sexual orientation as 
human rights issues), or whether they add a layer of complexity to the quest for supporting 
the universality of human rights on the basis of the existence of uniform norms on a given 
topic, remains an open question, as will be demonstrated. 
2. Early Conceptual Contributions by Special Procedures to International Human 
Rights  
The expertise of special procedures mandate holders has been regularly used to assist in 
the codification of new international human rights standards.5 As early as 1976, the 
Commission on Human Rights ordered its Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern 
Africa to evaluate the Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Seminar on 
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5 Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A critique and early assessment (Routledge, 
2013) at 110–1. 
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the Eradication of Apartheid and in Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa.6 
Conceptual contributions by experts in charge of special procedures have been facilitated by 
the political nature of the resolutions to which they owe their existence. The open-ended 
nature of these resolutions has allowed mandate holders to use a wide range of binding and 
non-binding national, regional and international norms as normative frameworks to evaluate 
the information brought before them. The codification of norms by special procedures has at 
times culminated in the approval of a Declaration by the General Assembly which may be 
the leading or exclusive normative framework for a given field, such as extreme poverty, 
internally displaced persons or business and human rights.7  
Mandate holders of special procedures are formally required to evaluate the 
information they receive in the light of any internationally recognised human rights standards 
relevant to their mandate, as stated by the operative paragraph 6 of their Code of Conduct,8 
which codified a practice already well established among them. However, some mandates 
were created to monitor rights with no clear normative framework identified; for example, the 
mandates on foreign debt, the use of mercenaries as a means of impeding the right to self-
determination, the right to water and the right to food. Therefore, some mandate holders 
have had to focus on clarifying, and sometimes codifying, the human rights standards they 
are called upon to promote and implement. 
The oldest thematic procedure, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, has included thematic studies in its reports from its inception, relying on a 
wide range of international human rights instruments.9 Its 1981 report included a study of the 
wide range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights infringed by the practice of 
enforced or involuntary disappearances.10 The Working Group based its analysis on the full 
range of relevant human rights instruments. These included the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR); the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners;11 and Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of 12 
August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. It also 
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7 See section 4 below. 
8 HR Council Res 5/2, 18 June 2007. 
9 The Working Group on Enforced Disappearances was established by the UNCHR Res 1980/20, 29 
February 1980. 
10 E/CN.4/1435, at paras 184–187. 
11 ECOSOC Res 663 C (XXIV), 31 July 1957. 
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relied on other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,12 as well as the report of the 
Working Group on the situation of human rights in Chile.13 In subsequent reports, the 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has been completing and 
updating its normative framework by focusing on other international human rights provisions 
potentially violated in relation to groups affected by disappearances such as children and 
mothers14 or other relatives of the victims.15 
The Special Rapporteur on arbitrary and summary execution is another early 
example of the breadth of normative standards used by special procedures to delimit the 
conceptual and legal contours of their mandates. From his first report in 1983, the then 
Special Rapporteur, Amos Vako, listed the international and national standards used to carry 
out his work, including the UDHR; ICCPR; ACHR; ECHR; the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; commentaries of the Human Rights Committee; Code of Conduct of Law 
Enforcement Officials;16 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment;17 Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;18 Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
Protocols; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; and 
numerous General Assembly resolutions.19  
In the context of delimiting the scope of his mandate, the first Special Rapporteur on 
torture, Peter Kooijmans, addressed from his first report the meaning of ‘torture’ in 
international law, as well as the judicial and administrative measures available to prevent it 
and mitigate its effects.20 The report contained an analysis of the conditions under which 
torture is normally perpetrated.21 More significantly, it introduced innovative approaches to 
the topic of torture. The Special Rapporteur was the first human rights monitoring body to 
recognise rape as a method of torture and to report on the use of gender-based torture such 
as rape, sexual assaults and sexual threats.22 Koojimans was also ahead of his time when 
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12 GA Res 34/179, 17 December 1979; and GA Res 35/188, 15 December 1980. 
13 A/33/331.  
14 See E/CN.4/1492, at paras 164–171; and E/CN.4/1984/21, at paras 151–161. 
15 E/CN.4/1984/21, at paras 147–150. 
16 GA Res 34/169, 17 December 1979. 
17 GA Res 3452 (XXX) annex, 9 December 1975. 
18 Supra n 11. 
19 See E/CN.4/1983/16, at paras 22–47. On the conceptual analysis of the scope of the mandate, see 
paras 48–67. 
20 See E/CN.4/1986/15, at paras 22–54.  
21 Ibid. at paras 112–117. 
22 E/CN.4/1986/15, at para 119. This has been repeatedly established by subsequent special 
rapporteurs and relevant case law. See, for instance, report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, 
A/HRC/7/3, at para 36. On the significance and limitations of the recognition of rape as torture by the 
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he examined the legal framework applicable to the trade of implements specially designed to 
implement torture in 1986.23 This was a topic not properly considered by intergovernmental 
bodies until the twenty-first century, again by another mandate holder of the mandate on 
torture, Theo van Boven,24 with the first – and still unique – set of multilateral trade controls 
set up by the European Union in 2005.25 This expansive approach by the first mandate 
holders found opposition among states [it is immediate as these are the very first mandate 
holders][2], although the Commission on Human Rights did not immediately respond to their 
objections.26 The Code of Conduct of mandate holders of special procedures has since 
limited this practice27 and, currently, special procedures may only rely on treaties ratified by 
the state concerned when examining violations of human rights in relation to specific 
states.28 
3. Clarifying or Obscuring Contentious Human Rights Issues? 
Many mandate holders of special procedures have continued to devote a significant part of 
their reports to explaining the legal framework within which they develop their work. 
However, this activity has rarely followed a coherent approach and the outcomes constitute 
a myriad of analyses on a range of human rights topics. This section presents some of the 
most salient examples, illustrating the possible overlaps and contradictions within the 
system. The cases chosen demonstrate that the framework of analysis selected by mandate 
holders is crucial in determining the outcome and divergences between special procedures’ 
approaches to human rights topics. 
A. Hate Speech 
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Special Rapporteur in 1986, see Blatt, ‘Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture’ (1992) 19(4) New 
York University Review of Law and Social Change 821 at 833 and 847. For a compilation of 
international jurisprudence on the topic, see ‘Redress for Rape: Using international jurisprudence on 
rape as a form of torture or other ill-treatment’, 2013, available at: 
www.redress.org/downloads/publications/FINAL%20Rape%20as%20Torture%20(1).pdf. 
23 E/CN.4/1986/15, at para 120. 
24 See several studies on the situation of trade in and production of equipment which is specifically 
designed to inflict torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, its origin, destinations and 
forms: E/CN/4./2005/62, at paras 12–39; E/CN.4/2004/56, at paras 66–68; A/58/120, at paras 22–28; 
and E/CN.4/2003/69. Other failed attempts to codify the trade of torture equipment can be found in 
Dymond and Fraha, ‘The trade in torture technologies’, in ACAT, A World of Torture (ACAT-France, 
2013) 243. 
25 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods 
which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment [2007] OJ L 200/1; and Regulation (EU) No 1352/2011 of 20 December 2011 amending it 
(OJ L 338/31). 
26 Ramcharan, The concept and present status of the international protection of human rights: Forty 
years after the Declaration (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 136. 
27 Supra n 8 at Article 6(c). 
28 On the establishment of this rule and its implications, see Domínguez-Redondo, ‘Rethinking the 
Legal Foundations of Control in International Human Rights Law – The Case of Special Procedures’ 
(2011) 29(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 261. 
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The controversy over the cartoons portraying the Muslim Prophet Muhammad, published on 
30 September 2005 by the Danish newspaper Jyllnadds-Posten,29 provides a striking 
example of contradictory approaches by special procedures mandates. In this instance, the 
Human Rights Council requested a joint report by its mandate holders on racism and on 
freedom of religion on the question of incitement to racial and religious hatred.30 In their final 
reports the two mandate holders took divergent positions, which had the effect of fuelling 
rather than assuaging the controversy.31  
The Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, unequivocally expressed his 
condemnation of the cartoons, labelling them ‘racist’. As explained by Keane,32 the position 
of Doudou Diène was already well established in the context of drawing the conceptual 
contours of his report ‘Defamation of religion and Global Efforts to Combat Racism: Anti-
Semitism, Christianophobia and Islamophobia’,33 in which he based his analysis on Articles 
18 (freedom of religion) and 19 (freedom of expression) of the ICCPR.34 According to the 
Special Rapporteur the cartoons reflected ‘an alarming resurgence of defamation of religions 
… [and] failed to show the commitment and vigilance that [the Danish Government] normally 
displays in combating religious intolerance and incitement to religious hatred’.35 Diène used 
the joint report36 to reaffirm his previous position on the defamation of religions and what he 
viewed as the relationship with racist trends promoting racial and religious hatred in the 
context of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’.  
Meanwhile the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahanguir, 
adopted a more cautious approach towards limiting freedom of expression. Rather, that 
Special Rapporteur emphasised the distinction between racism and religious defamation.37  
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29 See Müller and Özcan, ‘The Political Iconography of Muhammad Cartoons: Understanding Cultural 
Conflict and Political Action’ (2007) 40(2) Political Sciences and Politics 287. 
30 See HR Council Decision 1/107, 30 June 2006, decided by a recorded vote of 33 votes to 12, with 
one abstention. The votes against came from Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, the Ukraine and the United 
Kingdom; the Republic of Korea abstained. 
31 Joint Report, ‘Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance’, 
A/HRC/2/3. 
32 Keane, ‘Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression’ (2008) 30(4) Human Rights Quarterly 845. 
33 See report submitted by Diène, E/CN.4/2006/17, following the request in UNCHR Res 2005/3, 12 
April 2005, at para 16. 
34 E/CN.4/2006/17, at paras 23–47. 
35 Ibid. at para 25. 
36 A/HRC/2/3. 
37 See Rehman, ‘The Sharï’ah, International Human Rights Law and the Right to Hold Opinions and 
Free Expression: After Bilour’s Fatwā’, in Frick and Müller (eds), Islam and International Law: 
Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 244 particularly at 
252. 
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At the heart of these seemingly contradictory positions are the different normative 
frameworks and interpretations used by each mandate holder to deal with the topic. The 
Human Rights Council had requested the mandate holders to examine the question under 
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR which prohibits ‘hate speech’;38 however, the joint report also 
engaged Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD).39 In Keane’s words: 
Jahangir’s comments are representative of the legal instruments that govern racial 
discrimination and religious intolerance. While racist speech is prohibited under 
Article 4 of the binding International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination 1965, no comparable international instrument exists in the area of 
religion. Her analysis was conducted solely under Article 20(2) ICCPR, and the 
Danish cartoons do not reach the required level to constitute incitement under this 
provision. Diène seems to associate the cartoons with racist propaganda, as 
prohibited by Article 4 ICERD. Jahangir appears not to agree with this assessment.40 
It is important to emphasise that the Human Rights Council’s request41 Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, who in 2008 provided his own 
understanding of the legal restrictions on freedom of expression.42 [3]Without referring to the 
report of his peers, he underlined his strong stance against defamation laws, a stance 
already published in 2002 along with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) Representative on freedom of the media, and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression.43 Complicating matters further, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which monitors implementation of 
the ICERD, took a similar stance as the Special Rapporteur on racism.44 For their part, the 
successors as special rapporteurs on religion and racism took a slightly different approach to 
their predecessors, underlining the importance of framing this issue within the existing 
human rights framework instead of viewing it as a matter of defamation of religion.45  
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38 Article 20(2) ICCPR provides: ‘Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’ 
39 Article 4 ICERD provides: ‘States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are 
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic 
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and 
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts 
of, such discrimination’. 
40 Keane, supra n 32 at 872. 
41 See HR Council Decision 1/107, 30 June 2006, supra n 30. 
42 A/HRC/7/14, at paras 30–53. 
43 Ibid. at para 43. 
44 Keane, supra n 32 at 873–4. 
45 A summary of the discussion and the positions held by the Chair of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination at the time, Anwar Kemal, and the newly-appointed Special 
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These divergent approaches to the same topic within the UN were a catalyst to 
dialogue and cooperation among the special rapporteurs involved in the interpretation and 
implementation of international standards on freedom of expression, freedom of religion and 
racial discrimination. This resulted in the emergence of consensus regarding some of the 
most controversial issues, such as blasphemy laws, and a departure from a focus on 
‘defamation of religion’.46 On 22 April 2009, the Special Rapporteurs on racism, freedom of 
religion and freedom of expression issued a joint statement enshrining a common view on 
‘defamation of religion’.47 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
hosted a multilateral discussion on the relationship between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR 
which took place in the context of expert workshops held in 2011, in Europe, Africa and Asia. 
The aim of these workshops was to arrive at a ‘comprehensive assessment of the 
implementation of legislation, jurisprudence and policies regarding advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence at 
the national and regional levels, while encouraging full respect for freedom of expression as 
protected by international human rights law.’48 Members of the Human Rights Committee, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the mandate holders of 
special procedures on racism, freedom of religion and freedom of expression participated in 
several working groups.49 The outcome report states a common UN position on the 
interpretation of Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR and Article 4 of the ICERD with specific 
recommendations to states on how to incorporate human rights legislation at domestic level.  
The conclusions regarding policies aimed at states, the UN and other stakeholders 
do little beyond acknowledging the importance of cooperating and sharing information 
between the various regional and cross-regional mechanisms working on these issues 
worldwide. Still, it can only be welcome that the dialogue served as the immediate precedent 
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Rapporteurs on racism, Githu Muigai, and on freedom of religion and belief, Heiner Bieledfedt, can be 
found in International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), ‘Support for “defamation of religion” 
continues to decline; draft resolutions passes by only 12 votes’, Press Release, 25 November 2010, 
available at: www.ishr.ch/news/support-defamation-religion-continues-decline-draft-resolution-passes-
only-12-votes.  
46 However, this does not mean that states within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have 
abandoned their positions on this topic: see Rehman and Berry, ‘Is “Defamation of Religions” Passé? 
The United Nations, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and Islamic State Practices: Lessons from 
Pakistan’ (2012) 44(3) The George Washington International Law Review 431. 
47 Joint Statement by Mr Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Ms Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion and belief, and Mr Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, ‘Freedom of expression and incitement to 
racial or religious hatred’, 22 April 2009, available at: 
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/docs/Joint_Statement_SRs.pdf.  
48 See ‘Rabat Plan of Action’, OHCHR Press Release, 2013, available at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/RabatPlanOfAction.aspx. 
49 The documentation resulting from these workshops, stakeholders’ positions and background 
papers is available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/Index.aspx. 
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for the adoption of General Comment No 34 on freedoms of opinion and expression by the 
Human Rights Committee in July 2011.50 The interpretation of the ICCPR by the three 
special rapporteurs was considered in the drafting process of the general comment.51 The 
discussion also seems to have prompted the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination to revisit Article 4 of the ICERD and to issue, in September 2013, its General 
Recommendation No 35 on combatting racist hate speech.52 While the Committee reiterates 
its belief that laws are needed to combat racist speech, it also took a more balanced view to 
the issue, favouring the Jahangir rather than the Diène approach, and seeking a more 
synchronised approach with other UN treaties.53 
B. Armed Conflicts and Applicability of International Humanitarian Law[4] 
The use of drones for targeted killings has renewed interest in the controversial discussion 
among scholars over the applicability of international human rights law in armed conflict 
situations.54 Pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict scenarios may lead to divergence in 
approach by special procedure mandate holders due to the lack of clear guidance in 
international law.55 A further opportunity for divergence arises where special procedures 
have been created with an unequivocal mandate to investigate situations that may involve 
violations of international humanitarian law, as is the case with the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories.56 This is so because, for the 
most part, mandates have been created without specific mention of the applicability of 
international humanitarian law as a legal framework of reference. Even when special 
rapporteurs have requested specific guidance from the Commission on Human Rights on 
this question, they have not always received an answer.57  
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50 General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, CCPR/C/GC/34. 
51 O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law 
Review 627 at 648 and 650–1. 
52 General Recommendation No 35: Combating racist hate speech, CERD/C/GC/35. 
53 McGonagle, ‘New General Recommendation Combating Racist Hate Speech’, Database on legal 
information relevant to the audiovisual sector in Europe, available at: 
merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2013/10/article7.en.html. 
54 See Ohlin, ‘Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?’ (2013) 13(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 27. 
55 Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel operation of human rights law and the 
law of armed conflict and the conundrum of jus ad bellum’ (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 592; and 
Hampson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law from the 
perspective of a human rights treaty body’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 549.  
56 Despite the clear mandate, Israel had strong objections to this as reflected in the report of the 
Special Rapporteur, who sought further guidance on this point from the Commission: see Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including 
Palestine, E/CN.4/2002/32, at paras 7–10. 
57 Domínguez-Redondo, ‘Making the Connection: Security and Human Rights’, in Bassiouni and 
Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty 
Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia, 2011) 255. 
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Third[5], as in virtually every other matter covered by special procedure mandates, 
the uncertain terms of the mandates have allowed experts to follow different approaches. 
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has interpreted the 
scope of his mandate to cover armed conflict scenarios engaging applicable humanitarian 
standards.58 The Special Representative on the situation of human rights in El Salvador 
devoted a specific section of his reports to the implementation of international humanitarian 
law.59 When Felix Ermacora took up the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Afghanistan, he laid down the legal framework relevant to his mandate, 
including international humanitarian law.60 However, others, such as the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detentions, have decided from the outset not to deal with situations and cases 
linked to the existence of an armed conflict.61 Similarly, in light of the competence of the 
International Red Cross to address situations of disappearance during international armed 
conflicts, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has determined not 
to deal with situations of international armed conflict, although it considers disappearances in 
internal armed conflicts when the agent perpetrating [is that the term used in the enforced 
disappearances convention?][6] an enforced disappearance is apparently a representative of 
the state.62  
The hosting of special sessions has contributed to the standardisation of the use of 
humanitarian law in the work of the Human Rights Council (and formerly the Commission) 
since the early 1990s. These special sessions are mostly linked to situations of armed 
conflict and, therefore, the mandates of the inquiry commissions and special procedures 
mandates resulting from the sessions are routinely empowered with the authority to gather, 
compile and investigate information on acts that constitute breaches of international 
humanitarian law.63 In addition, these resulting reports are made available to the Security 
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58 The position of the Special Rapporteur over the years is well summarised in Alston et al., ‘The 
competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts’ (2008) 18(1) European Journal of International Law 183 at 202–6. 
59 See, for instance, E/CN.4/1992/32, at paras 96–117; and A/47/596, at paras 105–117. 
60 E/CN.4/1985/121, at para 161. 
61 The Working Group established its position in its first report (E/CN.4/1992/20, at para 16), and it is 
reflected in its current working methods: currently published by the OHCHR as ‘Fact Sheet No 26: 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’, annex IV, available at: 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet26en.pdf.  
62 The Working Group established its position for the first time in relation to the cases of 
disappearances brought to its attention during the Iran–Iraq war: see E/CN.4/1983/14, at paras 118–
120. This was confirmed as a general position in the WGEID report in 1984: see E/CN.4/1984/21, at 
paras 20 and 21. See also the methods of work published in E/CN.4/1996/38, annex I at para 5; and 
A/HRC/13/31, annex 1 at para 11; and the comment on inconsistencies by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention and Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Detention in Domínguez-Redondo 
(2011), supra n 57 at 272–3. 
63 For the mandate of the inquiry commission established following the 5th special session on the 
situation of occupied Palestinian territories, see UNCHR Res 2000/S-5/1, 19 October 2000, at para 
6(a). See also UNCHR Res 1999/S-4/1, 27 September 1999, at para 6, for the mandate of the inquiry 
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Council. Since the creation of the Human Rights Council these sessions have increased 
exponentially, adding further to this trend.64 Under the Universal Periodic Review 
mechanisms, humanitarian norms are expressly called upon to evaluate the situation of 
human rights worldwide.65 Some special procedures considered such standards, not only 
because they have chosen to include them by their own initiative, but because they are 
included expressly in their mandates, established by the Human Rights Council. This 
development is nonetheless viewed with caution by some commentators and practitioners, 
because of its inconsistency and carry [7]a risk of undermining humanitarian standards if not 
taken seriously or if applied in a disjointed manner by human rights bodies.66 
C. Approaches towards Non-State Actors 
The importance of non-state actors as potential violators of human rights has been another 
live issue in the lifetime of special procedures.67 In the past, this subject has been addressed 
mostly in relation to the laws of armed conflict and the existence of paramilitary and armed 
opposition groups. Nonetheless, it involves a wide range of non-governmental actors 
potentially responsible for human rights abuses including international organisations, 
peacekeeping operations, transnational corporations and internationally-administered 
territories. 
For the most part, special rapporteurs have adhered to the less controversial norms 
of international law concerning responsibility for breaches of international law by confining 
their attribution of alleged human rights violations to state actors. As a consequence they 
have implicitly or explicitly adopted the principle that non-state actors should not be 
approached in the course of their investigations into cases or situations of human rights 
violations.68 Until recently it remained exceptional to read reports such as those of the former 
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commission on East-Timor; and UNCHR Res 1994/S-3/1, 25 May 1994, at para 21, for the mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda. Humanitarian law violations are present in the resolutions 
resulting from the first two special sessions on the former Yugoslavia, but were not articulated 
expressly as elements of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur: see UNCHR Res 1992/S-1/1, 14 
August 1991; and UNCHR Res 1992/S-2/1, 1 December 1992. 
64 By March 2014, twenty special sessions had been held by the Human Rights Council. 
65 See HR Council Res 5/1, 18 June 2007, endorsed by GA Res 62/434, 3 December 2007, at para 1. 
On the opposition by some states to this provision, see Domínguez-Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic 
Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session’ (2008) 7(3) Chinese 
Journal of International Law 721 at 727. 
66 O’Donnell, ‘Trends in the application of international humanitarian law by United Nations human 
rights mechanisms’ (1998) 38 International Review of the Red Cross 481. See also Meron, ‘The 
humanization of humanitarian law’ (2000) 94(2) American Journal of International Law 239 at 269 and 
270. 
67 One of the earliest contributions can be found in the 1992 Report of the Working Group on 
Enforced Disappearances, E/CN.4/1992/18, at paras 373–381.  
68 One of the early explicit explanations of this can be found in the 1986 report of the Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/1986/18, at para 34. Nonetheless, as visible in 
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Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in El Salvador, where he interpreted the 
political nature of the special procedure as giving him a licence to investigate human rights 
violations attributed to insurgents or guerrilla groups.69 Thus, even those experts who 
routinely acknowledge abuses of human rights perpetrated by non-state actors, such as the 
Special Rapporteur on summary executions,70 emphasise that their methods of work only 
permit them ‘to intervene when the perpetrators are believed to be government agents or 
have a direct or indirect link with the state’.71 
However, special rapporteurs have increasingly (though not unanimously) taken the 
approach that, while non-state actors cannot strictly be held accountable for human rights 
violations deriving from obligations they are not bound by – mainly inter-state human rights 
treaties they cannot ratify – they are nonetheless expected to respect common human rights 
standards such as those expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.72 The 
possibility of divergent approaches is acknowledged in the 2008 Manual of operations of the 
special procedures of the Human Rights Council,73 which devotes an entire section to the 
relationship between special procedures and non-state actors.74 It affirms states’ 
responsibility under international law for violations committed within their jurisdiction, either 
by state agents or others, and then leaves open the possibility of holding non-state actors ‘to 
account for human rights violations’, stating that they ‘may be relevant interlocutors in the 
quest to restore respect for human rights and to establish accountability for violations’.75  
The manual of operations makes explicit reference to the possibility of 
communication between special rapporteurs and the ‘de facto’ authority in specific 
territories,76 which confirms traditional principles of state responsibility.77 Many mandate 
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the report of the visit to Peru that same year, the Working Group has sometimes listed allegations of 
disappearances by non-state actors without investigating them: see E/CN.4/1986/18/Add.1; and 
E/CN.4/1987/15/Add.1.  
69 The mandate holder, José Antonio Pastor-Ridruejo, explained this decision, based on political and 
ethical considerations rather than legal principles, in ‘Les procédures publiques spéciales de la 
Commission des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies’ (1991) 228(3) Recueil de Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International 183 at 214–15. 
70 In his first report the mandate holder focused only on governmental actions, referring to them in 
subsequent reports. For a summary of this approach with references to the case law of the 
International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, see E/CN.4/2005/7, at paras 65–76.  
71 E/CN.4/2002/74, at para 71. 
72 See Clapham, ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations’ (2006) 88 
International Review of the Red Cross 491 at 504–7. 
73 Available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/Manual_Operations2008.pdf. 
74 Ibid. at section E, paras 81–83. 
75 Ibid. at para 81. 
76 Ibid. at para 82. 
77 Article 9 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), included as annex in GA Res 56/83, 12 
December 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4. 
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holders have sent communications in relation to human rights cases and situations 
perpetrated by governments which may not have enjoyed international recognition, such as 
the Taliban in Afghanistan78 or the once unrecognised government of Haiti in the early 
1990s.79 Mandate holders have also addressed alleged human rights violations committed 
by international authorities in territories under their jurisdiction such as in Timor Leste 
between 1999 and 200280 and Kosovo between 1999 and 2008.81 
After the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, groups labelled 
as terrorist have gained prominence among non-state actors for whom accountability for 
human rights abuses is sought by states. Whether this is a change of focus or merely a 
change of language is a matter beyond the scope of this paper. However, the mandate 
holder with the closest relationship to the issue, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, has 
adopted a ‘neutral’ approach to this topic. The former mandate holder, Martin Scheinin, 
expressed his willingness to follow the work of the (then) Commission on Human Rights on 
the question of whether human rights violations can be attributed to non-state actors.82 
The launch of a Forum on Business and Human Rights within the United Nations in 
201283 is another milestone in the consideration of non-state actors by UN Charter bodies, 
and marks the culmination of a process ignited by the Global Compact project launched by 
the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999.84 This represents a substantial change 
from the sporadic and fragmented consideration of the impact of trade,85 economic aid86 and 
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78 See, for instance, the reports of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, A/56/253, 
at paras 25–30. 
79 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Haiti, E/CN.4/1993/47, at para 124(c). 
80 See Report of the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, E/CN.4/2002/79, at paras 355–
356. The communications of the Group during 2001 were sent to the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and to Indonesia. 
81 See the allegation letter addressed to the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) by the 
Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on 19 October 2011, available at: 
spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/19th/AL_Kosovo_19.10.2011_(1.2011).pdf. See also the dialogue established 
with UNMIK during the visit to Serbia (including Kosovo) in the 2009 report of the Special Rapporteur 
on freedom of religion or belief, A/HRC/13/40/Add.3. 
82 E/CN.4/2006/98, at paras 67 and 70. 
83 Established by HR Council Res 17/4 on Human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, 6 July 2011, at operative para 12. 
84 Annan, The Global Compact (United Nations World Economic Forum, 1999). 
85 See Domínguez-Redondo and Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘An Overview of Human Rights Instruments to 
Raise Concerns About Trade and Investment Policies’, in Murphy and Paasch (eds), The Global Food 
Challenge: Towards a Human Rights Approach to Trade and Investment Policies (Brot für Alle, 2009) 
92. 
86 See Commission on Human Rights Decision 1997/103, 3 April 1997, appointing an independent 
expert on the effects of structural adjustment policies on economic, social and cultural rights. On the 
study by Cassese regarding the impact of foreign economic aid and assistance on respect for human 
rights in Chile, see Ramcharan (2009), supra n 4 at 131. 
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debt,87 as well as that of business enterprises on the enjoyment of human rights that could 
be found, since 1977, in the reports of different subsidiary bodies of the former Commission 
on Human Rights.88 Mandate holders have also pioneered and rapidly consolidated the 
practice of scrutinising the role in human rights abuses of transnational corporations. This 
activity has merited scant contestation despite its problematic legal basis. The practice of 
engaging with corporations as actors potentially accountable for human rights violations 
outside the realms of traditional state responsibility is no longer confined to the few mandate 
holders endowed with competence to deal with violations typically involving business, such 
as the Special Rapporteur on toxic waste89 and the Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations.90 Rather, since 2011, the OHCHR has expressly acknowledged the 
standardisation of this practice, including in its publications on the ‘facts and figures of 
special procedures’. These annual publications explain that allegations of human rights 
violations are not only sent to states, but also to ‘third parties, such as international 
organisations or multinational corporations, requesting information on the allegation and 
calling for preventive or investigative action’.91 Nonetheless, the centralised facts provided by 
the OHCHR do not yet explain what percentage of communications or interactions are held 
with non-state actors. Only a few reports by special rapporteurs provide specific details 
about this practice. However, special rapporteurs increasingly refer to their engagement with 
corporations, although the vocabulary and approach remains far from uniform. The Special 
Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography uses the term 
‘corporate social responsibility’,92 while other mandate holders prefer to refer to business and 
human rights.93 This apparent inconsistency in terminology across mandate holders can be 
reconciled by the fact that following the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, with its affirmation of a corporate responsibility to respect human rights, 
the notion of ‘corporate social responsibility’ has to be reconceptualised from one in which its 
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87 See UNCHR Res 1998/24, 17 April 1998. The mandate on structural adjustment programmes and 
foreign debt got consolidated as a single mandate by UNCHR Res 2000/82, 26 April 2000. 
88 Ramcharan (2009), supra n 4 at 131–4. 
89 It is part of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur to examine and produce a list of transnational 
corporations engaged in the illicit traffic of toxic and dangerous products and wastes to developing 
countries as requested in the latest Human Rights Council resolution renewing the mandate: HR 
Council Res 18/11, 29 September 2011. 
90 For the Methods of Work followed by the Working Group, see A/HRC/WG.12/3/1, annex.  
91 OHCHR, United Nations Special procedures: Facts and Figures 2013 (OHCHR, 2014) at 10. See 
also the publications in 2012 at 10; and 2011 at 9.  
92 A/HRC/25/48, at paras 101–108. 
93 Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, A/HRC/17/31. 
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content is determined by corporations, to one which embodies the universal responsibility of 
all businesses to respect all human rights.94 
5. Codification of New International Human Rights Instruments 
Exceptionally, special procedures have been created with the main mandate of contributing 
to the codification of a particular area of law. This is the case, since the creation in 1986,95 of 
the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, who is mandated to examine 
incidents and governmental actions incompatible with the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief96 in addition to 
recommending remedial measures.97 The international standards considered by the Special 
Rapporteur extend beyond this instrument, as laid out in the digest published by the 
mandate holder in 2011, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the mandate.98 The 
standards include the UDHR, most core human rights instruments and the general 
comments of different treaty bodies. 
Most special procedures mandate holders have had to develop conceptual and 
normative frameworks relevant to their mandate in order to clarify the scope of their 
competences when dealing with cases or situations of human rights violations. This final 
section outlines some of the most salient initiatives by special procedures that have been 
endorsed or approved by their parent bodies, therefore endowing them with special 
authority. These new human rights standards serve as international benchmarks in a variety 
of areas. They enjoy a special position among other normative contributions by special 
procedures because they have been adopted or endorsed by the Human Rights Council (or 
former Commission) or/and the General Assembly. In the absence of specific restrictions on 
the geographic scope of their mandates, or the sources they can use in the course of their 
work, these codification efforts have involved the consideration of a topic from a universal 
perspective, taking into account the contributions of governmental, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental actors worldwide. In that sense, the normative standards developed by 
special procedures function as a catalyst to efforts to conceptualise and codify human rights 
worldwide. 
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94 Doyle, Indigenous peoples’ issues and participation at the UN Forum on Business and Human 
Rights: Progress to date and potential for the future (European Network on Indigenous Peoples, 
2014). See also Ruggie, Just Business (Amnesty International, 2013).  
95 UNCHR Res 1986/20, 10 March 1986. 
96 GA Res 31/138, 16 December 1976. 
97 This remains a central part of its mandate, as reiterated in HR Council Res 6/37, 14 December 
2007, at para 18(c).  
98 Rapporteur’s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2011, available at: 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/RapporteursDigestFreedomReligionBelief.pdf. 
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The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has pioneered 
codification of a new international instrument among special procedures – the Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,99 the immediate precedent for 
the Convention with the same name adopted fourteen years later.100 The Working Group 
instigated adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Declaration101 and contributed 
substantially to the final draft.102 The Working Group oversees states’ implementation of the 
Declaration, which constitutes the main legal framework within which it carries out its 
mandate.103 
The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons104 
understood that the main aim of his mandate was the elaboration of a specific norm for 
internally displaced people, and framed the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,105 
focusing his work on the preparation of such guidelines, and their distribution and 
promotion.106 The Guiding Principles have been further complemented by a handbook107 and 
legal annotations.108 In addition, they have had a measurable impact on legislation and 
policies. The case of Colombia, where the Guiding Principles have been used as basis of 
decisions of its Constitutional Court, is outstanding,109 but there are many other examples 
illustrating their influence at national, regional and international level.110 
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99 GA Res 47/133, 18 December 1992.  
100 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted 
by GA Res 61/177, 20 December 2006 (in force since 23 December 2010). 
101 See the recommendations of the Group enshrined in its reports E/CN.4/1985/15, at para 302; and 
E/CN.4/1988/19, at para 251(b). 
102 E/CN.4/1990/13, at paras 28–38. 
103 See Revised Methods of Work of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
A/HRC/19/58/Rev.1, annex II, adopted on 11 November 2011 and applicable from 1 January 2012, at 
para 1. 
104 Until 2010 the mandate holder was a Representative of the Secretary-General. On the decision to 
change the denomination, see HR Council Res 14/6, 23 June 2010. For the original mandate, see 
UNCHR Res 1991/25, 5 March 1991; UNCHR Res 1992/73, 5 March 1992; and UNCHR Res 
1994/68, 9 March 1994. 
105 See E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. On the background and process of framing these principles, see 
Bagshaw, ‘Internally Displaced Persons at the Fifty-Fourth Session of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, 16 March – 24 April 1998’ (1998) 10(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 548; 
and Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (American Society of 
International Law, 2000). 
106 Latest mandate for this special procedure can be found in HR Council Res 23/8, 13 June 2013. 
107 UNHCR, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Global Protection Cluster 
Working Group, 2010). 
108 Kälin, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, 2nd edn (American Society of 
International Law, 2008). 
109 Cepeda Espinosa, ‘The Constitutional Protection of IDPs in Colombia’, in Arango Rivadeneira 
(ed.), Judicial Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: The Colombian Experience (Brookings 
Institution/University of Bern, 2009) 1. 
110 Wyndham, ‘A Developing Trend: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement’ (2006) 14(1) Human 
Rights Brief 7; and Couldrey and Herson (eds), ‘Ten Years of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement’ (2008) Special Issue Forced Migration Review. 
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In 2011 the Human Rights Council formally endorsed111 the Guiding principles on 
business and human rights,112 and a year later adopted113 the Guiding Principles on extreme 
poverty and human rights.114 Both sets of guiding principles were drafted by the Special 
Rapporteurs with mandates on the concerned topic. These three sets of guiding principles 
provide global policy guidelines on topics not codified in international law, and are now 
widely used to evaluate state behaviour in relation to displacement of people, poverty, and 
business and human rights.115  
In addition, mandate holders cooperate with the OHCHR in drafting manuals, guides 
and other publications directly related to their mandates. Besides the Handbook for the 
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons cited above, other examples include the 
participation of the Special Rapporteur on torture in the drafting of the Manual on the 
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Istanbul Protocol)116 and the forthcoming Handbook 
for realizing the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur on the human right to water.117 In the context of the preparation of international 
human rights conferences, the experts in charge of special procedures have also contributed 
to studies that clarify existing normative frameworks and draw attention to the need for new 
regulations where appropriate.118  
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances have drafted the equivalent of ‘general 
comments/observations[8]’ following a model pioneered by treaty bodies. The Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances uses the same terminology as the treaty 
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111 HR Council Res 17/4, 16 June 2011, at operative para 1. 
112 Supra n 93. For a resource centre devoted to the guiding principles, see business-
humanrights.org/UNGuidingPrinciplesPortal/Home.  
113 HR Council Res 21/11, 27 September 2012, at para 2. In political terms it is important to notice that 
in this case the Council ‘adopts’ rather than ‘endorses’ the guiding principles. 
114 Sepúlveda Carmona, Final draft of the guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights, 
A/HRC/21/38. 
115 For instance, the Guiding principles on extreme poverty were mentioned in the European 
Committee of Social Rights’ decision on the merits in Defence for Children International (DCI) v 
Belgium (69/2011) Merits, 23 October 2012, at para 81.  
116 See HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1. The Manual was itself inspired by the Manual on the Effective Prevention 
and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, A/54/426, at paras 53–55. 
117 OHCHR, United Nations Special procedures: Facts and Figures 2013 (OHCHR, 2014) at 6 and 7. 
This document highlights other contributions to standard-setting during 2013 by the mandates on the 
use of mercenaries, trafficking in persons, countering terrorism, torture, summary executions and 
freedom of religion. 
118 See, for instance, the two thematic studies prepared by the Special Rapporteur on religious 
freedom prepared for the International Conference on Racism, analysing the issue of ‘aggravated 
discrimination’: A/CONF.189/PC.1/7, annex; and ‘legal and factual aspects of racial discrimination in 
education’: A/CONF.189/PC.2/22, annex 2. See also, in relation to the same conference, the 
contribution made by the Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants, A/CONF.189/PC.2/23. 
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bodies119 and devoted its first six ‘general comments’, issued between 1996 and 2006, to the 
interpretation of specific Articles of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance.120 Since the creation of the Human Rights Council such comments 
have addressed topics other than Articles of the Declaration, including the definition of 
enforced disappearance;121 disappearance as a crime against humanity122 and as a 
continuous crime;123 the right to truth;124 the right to recognition as person before the law;125 
and the specificity of disappearances when affecting children126 and women.127 
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention uses the terminology ‘deliberations’. Most 
of its deliberations are related to particular cases which raise matters of a general nature, the 
aim being to provide consistent precedents in order to assist as many states as possible to 
prevent the practice of arbitrary deprivation of liberty.128  
These deliberations offer another striking example of the potential to use special 
procedures to question the practice of other bodies operating at an international level on 
concomitant issues. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention accepted a complaint 
brought by General Duško Tadić, which challenged the legality of his detention by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the basis of Article 9 of the 
ICCPR (the right to liberty and security).129 The Group finally accepted its lack of 
competence to express a view on the conformity of a decision taken by an international court 
within the norms of international law. It did, however, decide that this raised an interpretation 
problem and adopted a ‘deliberation’ which would guide the Group in future if other 
communications relating to the administration of justice by an international criminal court 
were brought before it.130 The Working Group re-engaged with this topic in relation to the 
arrest of Joseph Kanyabashi, which raised the issue of the legality of the establishment of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.131 This was the first time a special procedure 
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119 See E/CN.4/1997/34, at paras 20 and 21. 
120 See E/CN.4/1996/38, at paras 48–58 (Articles 3 and 4); E/CN.4/1997/34, at paras 22–30 (Article 
10); E/CN.4/1998/43, at paras 68–75; E/CN.4/2001/68, at paras 25–32 (Article 17); and 
E/CN.4/2006/56, at para 49 (Article 18). 
121 A/HRC/7/2, at para 26. 
122 A/HRC/13/31, at para 39. 
123 A/HRC/16/48, at para 39. 
124 Ibid. 
125 A/HRC/19/8/Rev.1, at para 42. 
126 A/HRC/WGEID/98/1 and A/HRC/WGEID/98/1/Corr.1. 
127 A/GRC.WGEID/98/2. 
128 A compilation of its nine Deliberations, covering the issues of house arrest; rehabilitation through 
labour; immigrants and asylum seekers; allegations against the International Criminal Court for the 
former Yugoslavia; psychiatric detention; and deprivation of liberty linked to the use of the internet, is 
available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/CompilationWGADDeliberation.pdf.  
129 E/CN.4/2001/14, at paras 12–33. 
130 Ibid. 
131 E/CN.4/2003/8, at paras 49–60.  
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had examined the legality of the practice of another UN body, in particular one established 
as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council.  
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has since examined the question of the 
compliance with human rights standards by the United Nations by assessing the role of the 
General Assembly, the Security Council and the United Nations field presences in anti-
terrorist activities.132 The Special Rapporteur has concluded that Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter does not provide a legal basis for the Security Council framework of mandatory 
resolutions of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature,133 has commented on the 
compatibility of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Council with 
international human rights norms using case law from treaty bodies, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and British and Swiss domestic courts, among others,134 and has 
recommended a means of improving the accountability of the United Nations in this area.135  
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has also issued a decision on whether the 
deprivation of liberty of persons held at Al-Khiam prison in south Lebanon involved the 
responsibility of the government of Lebanon, Israel or the South Lebanon Army.136 With this 
opinion, the Working Group contributed to clarifying the fragmented jurisprudence regarding 
the need to evaluate attribution of unlawful acts of states, by endorsing the ‘overall test’ 
doctrine established by the International Court of Justice, rather than approaches developed 
by other adjudicatory bodies.137  
General comments and deliberations issued by the working groups use a variety of 
international and regional instruments as their normative framework. These include 
references to the American Convention on Human Rights, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of 
Persons, the Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War, and the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, among others. Leading case law articulated by other treaty bodies and 
international and regional courts is also frequently cited.  
6. Conclusions 
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132 See A/65/258. 
133 Ibid. at paras 33–58. 
134 See A/67/396, at paras 12–58. 
135 Ibid. at paras 68–80. 
136 E/CN.4/2000/4, at paras 11–18. 
137 For a commentary, see Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ 
Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18(4) European Journal of International Law 649 especially 
at n 19. See also Crawford, State Responsibility (CUP, 2013) at 141. 
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The impact of the special procedures in the creation and consolidation of 
international human rights standards, and their clarification of the scope of existing human 
rights norms, is widely acknowledged and one of their least contested activities. It 
nonetheless creates problems of coordination and duplication of tasks among different 
organs of the United Nations addressing similar or closely related matters.  
The different approaches of mandate holders in understanding their mandate and 
methods are partly the result of the myriad of existing mandates (55 special procedures were 
in force by March 2015).138 The single rubric ‘special procedures’ has enabled special 
rapporteurs to tackle different human rights violations (by country and by theme) through 
independent experts who have developed different methods of work. The preceding pages 
have outlined synergies and contradictions in the approaches adopted by special 
procedures regarding: (a) the scope and content of controversial topics of human rights law 
(hate speech); (b) the applicability of international standards to their mandates (international 
humanitarian law); and (c) their different understanding of those potentially responsible for 
human rights violations when dealing with non-state actors. 
Until 1993, when the OHCHR was created and when annual meetings of special 
procedures became institutionalised, the absence of general standards was complicated by 
the lack of centralised support and coordination. However, the absence of uniform standards 
and practice has not prevented these bodies from developing normative frameworks that 
have become gradually accepted as the most authoritative – and at times exclusive – 
codification of human rights standards in the diverse human rights covered by the special 
procedures.  
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138 The list is available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP. 
